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Abstract
The majority of World Bank donors are States parties to the main inter-
national human rights conventions. This article uses the right to health
as a lens for examining the obligations of donor States parties with re-
spect to their involvement in the World Bank’s development activities,
which use the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process as their
framework. The article uses the concept of core obligations to examine
and assess public expenditure budgeting in the health care sectors of
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda, as provided for in the PRSP process.
It argues that the current PRSPs make it impossible to fund public
health care at a level that satisfies the requirements of core obligations.
It concludes by calling on donor countries to comply with their interna-
tional human rights obligations.
La mayoría de los donantes del Banco Mundial son Estados que partic-
ipan en las principales convenciones y acuerdos internacionales sobre los
derechos humanos. Este artículo utiliza el derecho a la salud como una
lente para examinar las obligaciones de los Estados donantes respecto a
su papel en las actividades de desarrollo del Banco Mundial, las cuales
operan dentro del marco del Documento sobre Estrategias para
Reducción de la Pobreza (PRSP, por sus siglas en inglés). El artículo uti-
liza el concepto de obligaciones fundamentales para examinar y evaluar
la elaboración de los presupuestos de gastos públicos en los sectores de
atención de la salud de Mozambique, Rwanda y Uganda, como se
dispone en el proceso del PRSP. Argumenta que el marco de los PRSPs
actuales imposibilita el financiamiento de la atención de la salud
pública a un nivel que satisfaga los requisitos de las obligaciones funda-
mentales. Concluye instando a los países donantes a que cumplan sus
obligaciones para con los derechos humanos internacionales.
La majorité des bailleurs de fonds de la Banque Mondiale sont des États
signataires des principaux accords et contrats sur les droits de l’homme.
Cet article se sert du droit à la santé comme d’une lunette grossissante
en vue d’examiner les obligations des États bailleurs de fonds dans leur
participation aux activités de développement de la Banque mondiale,
auxquelles le Cadre stratégique de réduction de la pauvreté (CSRP) sert
de cadre juridique. Cet article part du concept des obligations de base
pour examiner et évaluer la budgétisation des dépenses publiques dans
le domaine de la santé au Mozambique, au Rwanda et en Ouganda, telle
qu’elle apparaît dans le CRSP. Il démontre que les CSRP actuels em-
pêchent le financement des soins de santé publique à un niveau satis-
faisant les exigences des obligations fondamentales. Il conclut en ap-
pelant les pays bailleurs de fonds à honorer leurs obligations interna-
tionales en matière de droits de l’homme.
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WORLD BANK POLICIES AND THE
OBLIGATION OF ITS MEMBERS TO
RESPECT, PROTECT AND FULFILL THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH
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Much of the discourse surrounding the relationship
between human rights and the World Bank’s development
assistance activities focuses on the extent to which the pro-
visions of international human rights treaties and interna-
tional human rights law have legal effect on the World
Bank.1
This article will take a different approach and examine
the obligations of World Bank donor members, the majority
of whom are States parties to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), both intended
to ensure the right to health.2,3 We contend that, by sup-
porting World Bank policies that contribute to violations of
human rights in developing countries, these states fail to
meet their international human rights obligations.4 We in-
tend for this article to promote discussion about how States
parties that are World Bank donors can be pressured to meet
their international human rights obligations at the World
Bank. States parties  cannot support and collectively pursue
World Bank policies that violate their international human
rights obligations.
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The article examines the consequences of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank Poverty
Reduction Strategy (PRS) process for the right to health in
three sub-Saharan African countries. In comparison to ear-
lier programs, the PRS process has led to increased country
ownership of aid programs and greater civil society engage-
ment in poverty policy debates, which are welcome
changes.  Yet, as we argue below, financing of public health
in the countries examined is constrained due to the macro-
economic concerns voiced by the World Bank and IMF. We
argue that there is a conflict between the World Bank’s poli-
cies under the PRS process and the right to health as defined
in the ICESCR and the CRC, and elaborated on by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the
Committee). Further, World Bank policies undermine
progress in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the right to
health by restricting health care budgets. This exposes the
dilemma faced by World Bank donor members that are also
States parties to the ICESCR and the CRC. As long as World
Bank policies fail to recognize that the respect, protection,
and fulfillment of all human rights is integral to equitable,
sustainable development, States parties that support World
Bank policies undermine the respect, protection, and fulfill-
ment of the human rights of some of the world’s most vul-
nerable populations. 
Focus on the Right to Health 
This discussion uses the right to health as a lens for ex-
amining the obligations of donor States parties with respect
to their involvement in the World Bank’s development ac-
tivities. Most of our analysis and conclusions apply to other
economic, social, and cultural rights affected by World Bank
policy, which are integral to realizing the right to health.
The right to health cannot be realized in isolation from
other rights because good health is dependent on factors
other than those just related to access to health facilities—
including education, clean water, sanitation, and adequate
housing.5 For example, women’s increased educational at-
tainment is key to improving health, not only their own,
but that of their children—especially in developing coun-
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tries. This interconnectedness between the right to health,
right to education, and right to non-discrimination on the
basis of gender is documented in the World Bank study,
Engendering Development:
Mothers’ illiteracy and lack of schooling directly disad-
vantage their young children. Low schooling translates
into poor quality of care for children and then higher in-
fant and child mortality and malnutrition. Mothers with
more education are more likely to adopt appropriate
health-promoting behaviors, such as having young chil-
dren immunized. Supporting these conclusions are
careful analyses of household survey data that account
for other factors that might improve care practices and
related health outcomes.6
An adequate level of funding directed toward health
and health services is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for the health of individuals and populations and for re-
alizing the right to health. Despite the obvious limitations,
we have chosen to focus on the funding for this one right as
this makes it easier to isolate and analyze spending.7 We be-
lieve that this approach has value as it helps to identify non-
compliance and suggest solutions.  
Focus on Core Obligations
One of the biggest obstacles in assessing the efficacy of
development aid and policies is the lack of appropriate com-
prehensive statistical indicators.8 We have decided to use
the human rights concept of “core obligations” as the basis
for assessing World Bank policies by examining budgeting
for the health care sector.9 There is no blueprint for fi-
nancing a system that allows a state’s citizens to realize the
right to health. The concept of the right to health, as the en-
titlement to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental well-being, is relative, as it varies over time and
place. Furthermore, the optimal balance of funding for
health, education, sanitation, and other key sectors varies
by country and community. The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has stated that core obligations
related to the right to health are non-derogable, and we be-
lieve that under-funding of the health sector results in core
obligations relating to health not being realized.10
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Focus on the International Development Association 
Throughout this article, we use the term “World
Bank,” assuming that whatever is said and published about
or by the World Bank applies to the International
Development Association (IDA). The IDA is one of five
legally independent institutions, which together form the
World Bank Group.11
We focus on the policies of the World Bank rather than
those of the IMF, although they often operate in tandem,
and it could be argued that the IMF is the prime mover of
some of the policies that they promote jointly. While the
IMF operates relatively independently, however, the IDA
arm of the World Bank depends on continuous fresh funding
(“replenishments”), which makes it easier to assess the re-
sponsibilities of its donors and to call for changes in be-
havior.12 This difference doesn’t imply that States parties
aren’t responsible for IMF policies that they approve. It is,
however, easier to assess responsibility and call for change
in their support for World Bank policies that they approve of
and fund on a continuing basis rather than policies pro-
moted by the IMF that they approve without funding.    
Moving From the Era of Structural Adjustment 
to the Era of Poverty Reduction 
From the early 1980s until the end of the 1990s, IMF and
World Bank macroeconomic policy was known as “struc-
tural adjustment.”13 Following criticism that structural ad-
justment fueled poverty, the IMF and World Bank launched
a new policy in 1999, “poverty reduction.”14 Also in 1999,
the IMF and World Bank agreed that “Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers” (PRSPs) would become the cornerstone of
future IMF and World Bank development aid.15 The 1999
IMF and World Bank “Enhanced Highly-Indebted Poor
Countries” (HIPC) debt relief initiative introduced the PRSP
as the pre-condition for all Bank and IMF concessional
lending. PRSPs are “national planning frameworks for low-
income countries,” which the World Bank and IMF claim are
country-driven with broad-based civil society participation.16
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A key distinction between structural adjustment and
PRSPs is the importance placed on “country ownership” and
participation. Before 1999, it was the World Bank and IMF
that developed the structural adjustment programs and con-
ditions, and these had to be approved by recipient countries.
Since 1999, the World Bank and the IMF invite recipient
countries to develop their own PRSPs, to then be approved
by the World Bank and IMF.17 This new approach suggests a
shift in the leadership role in developing policies. Some
argue that this shift is purely cosmetic, but it is generally
perceived to be significant, and we will treat it as such.18
The World Bank’s Approach to Human Rights: 
Grow Now and Realize Human Rights Later
On the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,19 the World Bank published Development
and Human Rights, which opens with this quote from World
Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn: “The message for
countries is clear: educate your people; ensure their health;
give them voice and justice, financial systems that work, and
sound economic policies, and they will respond.…”20
For countries that had been strongly encouraged to
adopt structural adjustment policies, the message was not
clear. What if sound economic policy, as defined by the
World Bank and the IMF, included public expenditure re-
form that made it impossible to “educate your people,” “en-
sure the health of your people,” or “give them a voice and
justice”? Which part of the message was to take precedence:
the health and education of the population or the need to re-
duce public expenditure?
A 1996 World Bank study examining the social dimen-
sions of structural adjustment revealed a consistent reduc-
tion in public health expenditure in most sub-Saharan
African countries that had been subject to structural adjust-
ment.21 A 1989 World Bank report about the impact of struc-
tural adjustment in Mozambique admitted that “the provi-
sion of health and education services has been severely af-
fected.” But at the same time, the report stressed that this
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was “consistent with macroeconomic objectives.”22 This
observation suggests that the World Bank placed more im-
portance on the Mozambican government’s pursuing sound
economic policies than maintaining education and health
services. Curtis Doebbler argues, “… even in the midst of
the debt crisis that precipitated SAPs [Structural
Adjustment Policies] it was recognized that ‘economic
growth does not necessarily help the poorest section of the
population, whose health is most at risk.’ In fact, Gro
Harlem Brundtland, former Director-General of WHO, has
suggested that the converse is true.”23
Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, a Senior Advisor at the World
Bank who leads and coordinates its work in relation to
human rights, summarized the Bank’s vision on human
rights in 2004: “Without wealth creation it would be im-
possible to see human rights being realized. And it is here
where the Bank is playing a fundamental role.”24
Other development experts are less positive about the
World Bank’s role. At the launch of the 2003 Human
Development Report, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Administrator, Mark Malloch-Brown,
said a “guerrilla assault” is needed on the so-called
Washington Consensus that sets out the general policies of
the IMF and the World Bank: “Rather than being told to
lower their sights, [developing countries] should be aided in
achieving the [Millennium Development] Goals, with the
IMF and World Bank helping to mobilize the needed addi-
tional assistance.”25
The World Bank’s attitude toward human rights can be
summarized as: Grow now, and realize human rights later.
The main difference between the strategies articulated by
Malloch-Brown and Sfeir-Younis lies with the funding
source. While Malloch-Brown insists on international assis-
tance, Sfeir-Younis seems to rely almost entirely on do-
mestic resources, which explains why he sees wealth cre-
ation as the prerequisite for the realization of human rights.
As we will discuss below, the World Bank encourages coun-
tries to decline or not seek the maximum international as-
sistance necessary to provide essential social services, if its
analysis suggests that additional international assistance
could have negative macroeconomic implications.26
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Conflicts Between the World Bank’s Structural
Adjustment Policies and the Right to Health 
The right to health, as enshrined in international
human rights instruments, suffers from vague normative
definition, which has made it hard for States parties to un-
derstand what standards they must fulfill and for citizens
and human rights advocates to hold them accountable.
Under Article 12(1) of the ICESCR, States parties must “rec-
ognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health.” This
broad language has been fleshed out by the Committee in its
General Comment on the Right to Health.27
Article 24 of the CRC provides more guidance and es-
tablishes norms for governments regarding the right to
health of children. With regard to development assistance,
Article 24(4) states: 
States parties undertake to promote and encourage in-
ternational cooperation with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the right recognized in
the present article. In this regard, particular account
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.28
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has in-
terpreted Article 24 as requiring: 
governments to take some specific actions to ensure the
right to health of children. First, a government must
provide certain data on the health of children to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child. Second, a gov-
ernment must show that it is taking steps to ensure that
it adequately invests in the health of children. Third, a
state must take steps to ensure that the health of chil-
dren is respected.29
Progressive Realization 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR and Article 24(4) of the CRC
recognize that the right to health will be achieved progres-
sively. With regard to the right to health under the ICESCR,
the Committee notes: “The concept of progressive realiza-
tion constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization
of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not
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be able to be achieved in a short period of time.”30 The prin-
ciple of progressive realization is “critical for resource-poor
countries that are responsible for striving towards human
rights goals to the maximum extent possible.”31
At first sight, it appears that there is no conflict be-
tween economic, social, and cultural rights, as defined in
the ICESR and the CRC, and the strategy followed by the
World Bank—progressive realization within a growing
economy. The concept of progressive realization, however,
should not be misinterpreted as justifying endless delays in
the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights,
while waiting for economic growth and sufficient domestic
resources to become available. It is not to be viewed as “an
escape hatch (for) recalcitrant states.”32 Such an interpreta-
tion would deprive economic, social, and cultural rights of
any meaningful value, especially for the disadvantaged and
vulnerable. Thus, the Committee noted that States parties
have “an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively
as possible.”33 Progressive realization also applies to re-
source-rich countries, namely World Bank donors.34
To counter interpretations of “progressive realization”as
implying “no immediate obligations,” the Committee em-
phasizes a series of principles that define the nature of States
parties’ obligations: the principle of non-retrogression, the
principle of core obligations, and the obligation to provide in-
ternational assistance. We have chosen to focus on the prin-
ciple of core obligations, as it provides us with standards that
can be used to assess World Bank policies.35
The Principle of Core Obligations
In clarifying the content of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights, the Committee drew on its experience, noting
that “the Committee is of the view that a minimum core
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent
upon every State party.”36 The principle of core obligation is
one of immediacy, which applies irrespective of the avail-
ability of resources.
Regarding the right to health, the Committee noted these
core obligations include at least the following obligations: 
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(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities,
goods, and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially
for vulnerable or marginalized groups; 
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food
which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom
from hunger to everyone; 
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing, and sani-
tation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water; 
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time de-
fined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential
Drugs; 
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facili-
ties, goods, and services;  
(f) To adopt and implement a national public health
strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological
evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole popu-
lation; the strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and
periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and
transparent process; they shall include methods, such as
right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which
progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the
strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their con-
tent, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable or mar-
ginalized groups.37
These non-derogable core obligations echo Article 24 of
the CRC, which has been ratified by all countries except the
United States and Somalia, pointing to the level of inter-
national acceptance of these standards.38,39 In accordance
with this, we base our analysis of World Bank policies on
the belief that a human rights approach requires that devel-
opment aid should be directly linked to the fulfillment of
core obligations as a matter of priority.
Structural Adjustment and Core Obligations
As stated earlier, the IMF and World Bank’s macroeco-
nomic policies from the early 1980s until the late 1990s
were realized through structural adjustment. According to a
1993 World Bank study, a budget of US$13 per capita, per
year, was the minimum required to provide an “essential
health services package” in a low-income country.40 With
regard to HIV/AIDS, the essential health services package in
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a low-income country does not provide for treatment and
appears to target only commercial sex workers.41 The
package provided substantially less than what the
Committee later defined as core obligations regarding
health. For example, the Committee has cited the obligation
“To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic
and endemic diseases; to provide education and access to in-
formation concerning the main health problems in the com-
munity, including methods of preventing and controlling
them.”42 During this period, sub-Saharan African countries,
which were strongly encouraged to adopt structural adjust-
ment programs, were far from realizing their core obliga-
tions, and their budgets were far below the US$13 figure re-
quired for the essential health services package.43
During the structural adjustment era, the World Bank
developed and implemented policies that resulted in already
insufficient budgets being further reduced in most sub-
Saharan African countries. A World Bank study compared
public health expenditure before, during, and after struc-
tural adjustment in 15 sub-Saharan African countries. Only
Uganda saw an increase in public health expenditure under
structural adjustment. On average, public health expendi-
ture fell 20% during structural adjustment and stagnated
after structural adjustment.44 In Mozambique, per capita
health expenditure fell from US$3.50 in 1986 to US$0.68 in
1988—after the introduction of a structural adjustment pro-
gram in 1987.45 If one accepts that US$13 per person is in-
sufficient to realize core obligations related to health, then
one can only conclude that SAPs resulted in retrogression in
realizing the right to health in many developing nations. In
this respect, structural adjustment policies violated the con-
cept of progressive realization of health found in the
ICESCR and the CRC. 
Persistent Conflicts under the World Bank
Poverty Reduction Strategy: New Ceilings
on Public Health Expenditure
In a lecture at the World Bank in November 2003,
UNAIDS Executive Director Dr. Peter Piot complained
about public health expenditure ceilings that hamper ade-
quate funding of AIDS programs.46 Bank President James
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Wolfensohn replied: “… we are currently, and for the last
several months, working with the [International Monetary]
Fund on this issue of limits on medium-term expenditure
framework for things that cannot be put aside and for which
grant funding very often is available. And I hope quite soon
that we will have some movement on that issue, because it
is a very real issue.”47
This is a remarkable admission from the World Bank.
Until then, World Bank and IMF staff members had regu-
larly denied their involvement in setting such ceilings. For
example, in 2002, the Ugandan Finance Ministry initially
stated that the grant that Uganda had received from the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
(GFATM) would be included as part of the existing health
care budget (not as an addition to that budget).48 The min-
istry stated that the GFTAM grant would not be used to in-
crease health care expenditures. Instead, the Ministry would
reduce funds coming to health care from other sources, in
order to maintian the predetermined expenditure ceiling for
health care. This in effect negated the goal off the GFATM
grant—namely increasing resources for health care in
Uganda. The Director of the IMF’s External Relations
Department rejected suggestions that the Finance Ministry
stance might have been influenced by the IMF: “It is not
true that Uganda may have to refuse aid for health or any
other poverty-eradication programs in order to adhere to
IMF-imposed guidelines.”49 The World Bank’s admission
that limits on expenditure for “things that cannot be put
aside and for which grant funding very often is available” is
indeed “a very real issue,” and, the fact that it is working
with the IMF to find solutions sheds a different light on the
IMF’s denial.
Wolfensohn’s comments, quoted above, refer to
Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), which a
World Bank working paper defines as: 
a top-down resource envelope, a bottom-up estimation
of the current and medium-term costs of existing policy
and, ultimately, the matching of these costs with avail-
able resources … in the context of the annual budget
process.50
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Of the 6 stages required to complete an MTEF, Stage 4 in-
volves “Setting medium-term sector budget ceilings (cab-
inet approval)” and Stage 5, “Medium-term sectoral pro-
grams based on budget ceilings.”51 Furthermore, the
working paper explains the importance of MTEFs: 
Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks are receiving
renewed attention in the context of the formulation of
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
Conceptually, MTEFs are the ideal tool for translating
PRSPs into public expenditure programs within a co-
herent multi-year macroeconomic and fiscal frame-
work.52
Almost all PRSPs include or refer to an existing MTEF.
An IMF review found that “virtually all PRSP financial
frameworks were identical to those in the programme pre-
viously agreed with the IMF.”53
A World Health Organization (WHO) report about the
impact of PRSPs on health describes PRSPs and their new
conditionality as follows:
The World Bank emphasizes that PRSPs should be
written and produced by countries themselves and
should go beyond macroeconomic stabilization and lib-
eralization to address issues of poverty and equitable
growth. However, PRSPs must also be approved by the
Boards of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) before access to debt relief and
concessional lending is granted. Moreover, Bank and
Fund consultants often assist in the drafting of PRSPs.
This suggests—and country experience confirms—that
to a certain extent PRSPs must conform to Bank/Fund
interpretations of “sound economic policy.54
Once included in an agreed PRSP, countries are no
longer free to adapt their MTEF if a new essential need
arises or if they can obtain a grant that wasn’t foreseen (for
example, a grant from the GFATM) without IMF and IDA
approval to change the PRSP.55
How flexible are the IMF and the IDA toward renegoti-
ating a previously agreed MTEF? The outcome of the above-
mentioned dispute between the Ugandan finance and health
ministries—the finance ministry finally agreed to accept the
GFATM grant—suggests that the ceilings are flexible.56
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Other reports suggest, however, that this flexibility
should not be taken for granted. A report on the Rwandan
PRSP process explains how the Rwandan government tried
using the PRSP process to move away from the existing
MTEF by proposing two new expenditure frameworks—one
based on real needs (the “unconstrained” scenario), and the
other based on a modest increase of international grants (the
“constrained” scenario).57,58 Both new scenarios are in-
cluded in the final PRSP paper, and both foresee a substan-
tial increase in public health expenditure, including the pur-
chase of drugs to treat AIDS.59 But as the report indicates,
“the higher scenarios—with the major increases in poverty-
reducing expenditures—were not discussed.” Furthermore,
“The long-run question of financing anti-poverty expendi-
tures out of increased external resources remained unset-
tled. As a result, the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility document specifies that if expenditures can be iden-
tified with ‘no macroeconomic impact’ and financed by
extra grants, the programme may be revised in future years
to accommodate this.”60
To be allowed to provide the health care it wants to its
citizens, the government of Rwanda will need to demon-
strate that it has secured additional grants, and it will need
to demonstrate that accepting these grants won’t have a
macroeconomic impact.61 Only IMF and World Bank macro-
economists will perform the authoritative assessment of
whether or not there is a macroeconomic impact.62,63 This,
together with the fact that some countries might be reluc-
tant to demand a renegotiation, is the real significance of
the ceilings. 
Costing Core Obligations and MTEF Ceilings
In January 2000, Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Director-
General of WHO, established the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health (CMH).64 The purpose of the
CMH was “to analyze the impact of health on development
and to produce reports and scholarly studies on health-
related interventions and their impact on economic growth
and equity in developing countries.”65
One of the CMH’s working groups addressed the tech-
nical options, constraints, and costs for mounting a major
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global effort to improve the health of the poor. The cost
analysis estimated the cost of scaling up the coverage of 49
priority health interventions in 83 developing countries.
The target coverage levels were set in accordance with in-
ternationally agreed upon targets, such as the Millennium
Development Goals, and targets were set for the years 2007
and 2015.66
The CMH estimated that sub-Saharan African low-
income countries would need to spend US$40 per capita to
reach the target coverage levels set for 2007, and US$50 per
capita to reach the target coverage levels set for 2015.67 It esti-
mated that these countries would be able to mobilize
domestic resources of US$15 per capita in 2007 and US$20 per
capita in 2015. It concluded that contributions from the inter-
national community would be needed to support the
financing gap of US$25 per capita in 2007 and US$30 per
capita in 2015.68–70
Although the CMH costing exercise didn’t explicitly
refer to the core obligations as defined by the Committee,
the interventions considered and targets set by the CMH fell
within the scope of these core obligations. (See Table 1)71
The CMH considered only those interventions for which
the required medicines are included in the WHO model list
of essential drugs. Therefore, these interventions fall within
the scope ensuring the the right of access to health facili-
ties…” and “… providing essential drugs, as from time to
time defined under the WHO Action Programme on
Essential Drugs” of the core obligations.72 We consider the
targets set by the CMH as “expert advice” on what is rea-
sonable and achievable, and for the purposes of this article,
we shall use the US$40 per capita figure as the minimum
expenditure level currently needed to comply with the core
obligations to realize the right to health.
One argument against using this US$40 figure as a
benchmark to measure compliance with core obligations is
that this amount assumes that the international commu-
nity will provide more than half (US$25), while sub-Saharan
African low-income countries will contribute US$15 from
domestic resources. However, the governments of every
sub-Saharan African low-income countries cannot possibly
Commission on Macroeconomics 
and  Health Interventions103
Tuberculosis Treatment:
• Directly observed short course
treatment for smear negative patients 
Malaria Prevention:
• Insecticide treated nets
• Residual indoor spraying
HIV/AIDS Prevention:
• Youth-focused interventions
• Strengthening of blood
transfusion systems 
• Treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases
• Interventions working with 
sex workers and clients
• Condom social marketing 
and distribution
• Workplace interventions
• Voluntary counselling and testing
• Prevention of mother-to-child
transmission
• Mass media campaigns
HIV/AIDS Care:
• Palliative care
• Clinical management of 
opportunistic illnesses
• Prevention of opportunistic
illnesses
• Home-based care
HIV/AIDS HAART:
• Provision of HAART
Maternal conditions-related 
interventions (ante- and intra-partum):
• Antenatal care
• Treatment of complications
during pregnancy 
• Skilled birth attendance
• Emergency obstetric care
• Post-partum care
(including family planning)
Childhood disease-related
interventions (care): 
• Treatment of various conditions
(acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea, 
causes of fever, malnutrition, anaemia)
Childhood disease-related
interventions (prevention):
• Vaccinations (BCG, OPV, DPT,
Measles, Hepatitis B, HiB)
Core Obligations104
To provide essential drugs, as from time to
time defined under the WHO Action
Programme on Essential Drugs
To take measures to prevent, treat, and
control epidemic and endemic diseases
To take measures to prevent, treat, and
control epidemic and endemic diseases.
To provide essential drugs, as from time to
time defined under the WHO Action
Programme on Essential Drugs
To take measures to prevent, treat, and
control epidemic and endemic diseases.
To provide education and access to infor-
mation concerning the main health prob-
lems in the community, including methods
of preventing and controlling them
To provide essential drugs, as from time to
time defined under the WHO Action
Programme on Essential Drugs
To ensure equitable distribution of all
health facilities, goods, and
services
To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal
as well as post-natal) and child health care.
To ensure access to the minimum essen-
tial food which is nutritionally adequate
and safe; to ensure freedom from hunger to
everyone
To provide immunization against the
major infectious diseases occurring in the
community
Table 1. The CMH’s priority health interventions and core obligations.
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be expected to “obtain” US$25 in the form of international
aid and provide US$15 from domestic sources. They could
at most be required to make best efforts to secure such
grants from wealthy states.
The Committee anticipated this problem when it de-
fined the core obligations. The primary duty holder with re-
gard to realizing international human rights for those under
their authority is the national state. Under the ICESCR, how-
ever, wealthier countries have progressive obligations toward
the citizens of developing countries to ensure that all people
can realize their, economic, social, and cultural rights.73
Regarding the level of this assistance, the Committee has
suggested that wealthier countries should devote 0.7% of
GDP to international development assistance.74
This obligation to provide assistance creates a kind of
collective obligation for “wealthier” States parties (those “in
a position to assist”) toward all developing countries; how-
ever, from the viewpoint of the developing country, it is im-
possible to identify which countries should help them and to
what extent. We can therefore summarize the core obliga-
tion of sub-Saharan African low-income countries, with re-
gard to financing the right to health, as the obligation to raise
at least US$15 per capita domestically and to request an ad-
ditional US$25 per capita from wealthy countries.
Core Obligations and Spending Ceilings 
With this financial interpretation of core obligations in
mind, we now turn to an examination of spending, which
can be found in the MTEFs. Some PRSPs include MTEFs or
provide the ceilings set in the MTEF, including the PRSPs for
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda. These three countries
are all low-income sub-Saharan African countries that are fa-
vored by donors, and the content of many of their discus-
sions with the IMF and World Bank is publicly available.75,76
Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region in the world;
HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death, and malaria and tu-
berculosis remain major problems.77
The Ugandan PRSP, which includes an MTEF ceiling,
establishes a health budget of less than US$8 per capita for
2002-2003.78 The Rwandan PRSP also includes an MTEF
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ceiling and includes a health budget of less than US$3 per
capita for 2004.79 The Mozambican PRSP includes an MTEF
ceiling as well, and it provides for a health sector budget of
just below US$9 per capita in 2005.80
It is important to understand that these ceilings include
both domestically sourced funds and international donor
funds. Thus, these ceilings prevent the governments of
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda from meeting the
US$15 per capita for health expenditure target that the
CMH specified they should raise domestically. In addition,
the ceilings make it impossible for these governments to re-
quest the US$25 per capita from donor countries. It is highly
unlikely that donor countries will provide financial assis-
tance for interventions that aren’t foreseen in the PRSP, as
the PRSP is, in theory, comprehensive and country-driven.
It is equally unlikely that countries like Mozambique,
Rwanda, and Uganda will seek funding outside the PRSP be-
cause the PRSP is supposed to be country-owned—that is,
the recipient countries are supposed to be driving the
process. To undermine this understanding would under-
mine the whole PRSP process and possibly endanger the
funding that is available through the PRSP. Further, several
donor countries, including the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, have already declared that they will use the PRSP
as the main framework for their support.81 The European
Commission has indicated that its “Accelerated Action on
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis” action program is
striving for coherence with PRSPs.82,83
The possibility of countries applying for grants beyond
the MTEF and the PRSP, however, isn’t entirely excluded.
The GFTAM does not use PRSPs as a framework. It works
through Country Coordination Mechanisms (CCMs), which
include different stakeholders, including civil society, pri-
vate and public sector representatives, and development
partners.84 These CCMs can prepare applications outside
PRSPs, which is what happened in Mozambique, Rwanda,
and Uganda, creating serious tensions. Even the World Bank
acknowledges that these tensions exist: “The availability of
additional, earmarked grant funds for health—from mecha-
nisms such as the Global Fund—can and has led to tensions
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between financial ceilings set by ministries of finance
aiming to maintain macroeconomic stability on one hand,
and the need to expand the resource envelope in the health
sector, on the other hand.”85
As explained above, the IMF and the World Bank can
approve an MTEF modification, and they can raise the ceil-
ings, as appears to have been the case with Uganda. The
Rwandan case suggests that two conditions must be satis-
fied: additional funds must come from grants, and they
must not create macroeconomic distortions, (for example,
causing “Dutch disease”).86,87 The concern of the IMF and
World Bank is that the Dutch disease effects of aid will in-
crease inflation, lower growth, and inhibit the development
of the tradable goods sector.88 In an IMF working paper, the
authors argue that several African countries benefiting from
HIPC debt relief will soon build up unsustainable debt
levels, leading to an increase in non-debt creating grants,
rather than loans. But they immediately warn: “In some
cases, external financing may even be detrimental to sectors
necessary to promote growth and reduce poverty—for ex-
ample, to agriculture and manufacturing—due to Dutch dis-
ease effects.”89 Thus, the IMF and the World Bank might re-
fuse to renegotiate an agreed MTEF, even if a donor grant is
available and badly needed to realize minimum essential
levels of the right to health, when they feel that the accept-
ance of an additional grant might cause Dutch disease.  
The impact of the fear of Dutch disease on aid policy led
a senior official at the Ugandan Health Ministry to complain,
“The IMF, World Bank and Ugandan Finance Ministry have
decided that protecting against inflation is more important
than protecting peoples’ lives.”90 It is clear that the World
Bank and IMF believe that Dutch disease is a real problem;
however, Gustav Ranis argues that its potential affects are
probably overstated.91 Whether aid-induced Dutch disease is
a real threat to developing economies or “a bogus theory,” as
former US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill labeled it, is an
interesting question, although it falls beyond the scope of
this article.92 General Comment 14 on the right to health
makes it clear that, from a human rights perspective, even
the threat of macroeconomic distortions like Dutch disease
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cannot justify public health expenditure below the level nec-
essary to comply with core obligations.93 To summarize:
• World Bank policy prohibits the governments of
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda from raising the
US$15 per capita domestic share of the resources re-
quired to comply with their core obligations to realize
the right to health; 
• World Bank policy prohibits the governments of
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda from requesting
US$25 per capita development assistance from
donors—the donor share of the resources required to
comply with their core obligations to realize the right
to health;
• World Bank policy might even prohibit the govern-
ments of Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda from ac-
cepting development assistance whenever the World
Bank and the IMF believe that accepting such grants
might cause macroeconomic distortions.
Based on the above analysis, we argue that World Bank
policies play a role in the inability of these countries to
comply with their core obligations to realize the right to
health. We consider non-achievement of the CMH target of
$40 per capita as non-compliance with core obligations be-
cause a public health expenditure budget that doesn’t pro-
vide for the achievement of CMH targets is a public health
expenditure budget that does not allow a state to comply
with its core obligations.      
Other sub-Saharan African low-income countries, less
popular with donor states, face the same challenges, or
even worse, because they receive less international aid and
technical support. Therefore, what is true for these three
countries is probably even more so for other sub-Saharan
African low-income countries. We believe that, despite im-
proving on structural adjustment, the PRS process con-
tinues to result in underfunding of the health sector in sub-
Saharan African low-income countries.
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A Dilemma for World Bank Members That 
Are Also States Parties to the ICESCR
World Bank policies can be changed, and  the majority
of World Bank members are also States parties to the
ICESCR and the CRC giving them the power to influence
World Bank policy.94 The IDA’s dependence on regular con-
tributions from donors, known as “replenishments,” means
that donors can exercise this power every couple of years.
Also, the IDA is ruled by a “one dollar, one vote” principle
rather than a “one country, one vote” principle, and, as of
2004, States parties to the ICESCR together controlled
76.28% of the votes on the IDA Board, giving them signifi-
cant influence.95,96 The latest replenishment raised approxi-
mately US$24 billion over three years, including about
US$13 billion in promised new donor contributions, begin-
ning in July 2002.97
This creates an ambiguous situation for donor States
parties to the ICESCR and the CRC. While individually they
might strive to realize the right to health domestically and
internationally, collectively they support an institution that
neither respects, nor protects, let alone fulfills, the right to
health in recipient states. States parties contributing to the
IDA’s budget not only support the IDA through their repre-
sentation on the IDA’s Board of Governors, they also fund
the IDA. As discussed earlier, these funds can act as an in-
centive for developing countries to adopt retrogressive
measures, to cap public health expenditure at levels insuffi-
cient to meet their core obligations to respect, protect, and
fulfill human rights, and deter them from seeking additional
development assistance.  
Do countries violate their obligations under the
ICESCR and the CRC if collectively they support a multi-
lateral institution that implements strategies that their ob-
ligations prevent them from implementing individually?
The question is particularly relevant when applied to public
health expenditure ceilings, which deter developing coun-
tries from seeking or accepting additional development as-
sistance. We believe that when States parties support IMF
and World Bank policies, and in particular when they make
financial contributions to the IDA, they collectively support
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policies that result in human rights violations in developing
countries that cannot simultaneously comply with World
Bank macroeconomic prescriptions and the core obligations
related to realizing the right to health. Our contention is
supported by the Committee’s assertion that States parties
have an obligation “to ensure that their actions as members
of international organizations take due account of the right
to health.”98 The World Bank acknowledges that improving
health contributes to economic growth, although in an
analysis of 21 PRSPs, the World Health Organization found
“none mention health as a human right.”99
Conclusion
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights offer a conceptual guide to the in-
terpretation of rights protected by the ICESCR.100 They
specifically address the obligations of States parties, acting
collectively through international organizations, urging
states “to use their influence to ensure that violations do
not result from the programmes and policies of the organiz-
ations of which they are members.”101
A change in World Bank policy requires pressure from
States parties that are World Bank members. States parties
to the ICESCR control over 75% of IDA votes, so as both
donor and recipient countries they can “use their influence”
to make the IDA respect, protect, and fulfill economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights. Thus far, any attempts to use this
influence have not been very effective as evidenced in the
underfunding of the Rwandan, Mozambican, and Ugandan
health care sectors.
If attempts to use their influence fail, donor States par-
ties also have the option to withhold contributions to future
IDA replenishment rounds because funding World Bank
policies and programs would be in violation of their inter-
national human rights obligations. As an intermediate solu-
tion, donor States parties should condition their contribu-
tion to the next IDA replenishment on the requirement that
it only be used to fund loans to countries that develop a
PRSP that, in theory, allows them to comply with their core
obligations to realize economic, social, and cultural rights.
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If they contribute to PRSPs that respect the human rights
obligations of recipient countries, they would not be sup-
porting policies that violate human rights—even as imple-
mentation may fall short. Finally, they have the option of
suspending or threatening to suspend their membership in
the IMF and World Bank, which is far more realistic for
donor States parties, than recipients who are dependent on
concessional loans. The legal status of States parties that
continue to fund World Bank policies that contribute to
human rights violations in third states requires further re-
search. Accountability may encourage donor States parties
to push for change.
World Bank donor members that are States parties need
to take the initiative by informing the World Bank that, re-
gardless of the extent of its obligations under international
human rights law, the majority of its members have the re-
sponsibility to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights do-
mestically and internationally, and that they will not finan-
cially support policies and programs that fail to do so. It is a
moral imperative, and fundamental to their obligations as
States parties, to comply with their international human
rights obligations. Are wealthy States parties willing to do
this, or is their support of IMF and World Bank macroeco-
nomic policies just “a fancy way to tell poor countries not
to come to us with their problems, and certainly not to ask
for more financial help?”102 Donor States parties can with-
draw their support of the IMF and the World Bank, and from
a legal perspective we believe they should, so long as these
institutions’ programs and policies violate economic, social,
and cultural human rights.
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